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Abstract
This article advances a new account of Kant’s views on conceptualism. On
the one hand, I argue that Kant was a nonconceptualist. On the other
hand, my approach accommodates many motivations underlying the
conceptualist reading of his work: for example, it is fully compatible with
the success of the Transcendental Deduction. I motivate my view by
providing a new analysis of both Kant’s theory of perception and of the
role of categorical synthesis: I look in particular at the categories of
quantity. Locating my interpretation in relation to recent research by
Allais, Ginsborg, Tolley and others, I argue that it offers an attractive
compromise on this important theoretical and exegetical issue.
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1. Introduction
‘Conceptualism’ and ‘nonconceptualism’ are used across the philosophical
literature in multiple, non-coextensive ways. Since the concern here is with
Kant, I frame the debate using his terminology. I deﬁne nonconceptualism
as the thesis that a subject may possess empirical intuitions of
spatiotemporal particulars even if that subject entirely lacks conceptual
capacities.1 I use the term ‘subject’ broadly – one key instance of such
‘subjects’ will be non-rational animals. Let conceptualism be the thesis that
nonconceptualism is false. The debate is also often presented in terms of
perception: the conceptualist holds, and the nonconceptualist denies, that
concepts ‘have an indispensable role’ even in ‘the mere perceptual
presentation of particulars in empirical intuition’ (Grifﬁth 2010: 199;
similarly Allais 2009: 384). As I discuss in section 2, however, care is needed
here: there is an important difference between contemporary uses of
‘perception’ and Kant’s own employment of Perception and related terms.
I will therefore use the deﬁnition given in terms of empirical intuitions.
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In this article I argue for two claims: (i) that Kant is a nonconceptualist;
(ii) that in the case of normally functioning, adult humans, however,
empirical intuitions are necessarily subject to categorical, and thus
conceptual, synthesis. My proposal is thus intended in a spirit of
compromise – hence the article’s title. I am not literally claiming, of
course, that Kant endorses both conceptualism and nonconceptualism;
given my deﬁnitions, that would be contradictory. Rather, I hold
that whilst he is a nonconceptualist, this position, once properly
understood, can accommodate many of the motivations and commit-
ments driving Kantian conceptualism. Let me say something more
speciﬁcally about the relation between (i) and (ii). It is sufﬁcient to
validate nonconceptualism, as deﬁned, if there are any subjects enjoying
empirical intuitions in the complete absence of conceptual capacities; so
nonconceptualism would be true if Kant understood non-rational
animals (henceforth ‘animals’) in this fashion. But if that were estab-
lished, two vital issues would remain. First, it would be crucial to clarify
whether only such animals could have nonconceptual intentional states.
Many contemporary nonconceptualists assume that their arguments
apply unproblematically to humans: Heck, for example, motivates his
position by asking his – presumably human – readers to ‘[c]onsider your
current perceptual state’ (Heck 2000: 489). So we need to understand
why, once placed in a human context, Kant believes that empirical
intuitions are necessarily accompanied by category use: given his
nonconceptualism, this cannot be a direct condition on empirical
intuitions themselves. In short, how can (ii) be true given (i)? As
I will explain, my view of this is quite different from that of Allais, for
example. Second, there is a widespread assumption that Kant’s argument
for the categories implies the falsity of nonconceptualism: As Ginsborg
puts it:
The central line of thought [in the Transcendental Deduction] is
that the objective validity of the categories depends on their
having a role to play, not just in explicit judgment, but also in
our perceptual apprehension of the objects about which we
judge. (Ginsborg 2008: 69; similarly Bowman 2011: 421–2,
Grüne 2011: 465–6)
If the possibility of non-categorial intuitions, what Hanna called
‘rogue’ intuitions, is to be admitted anywhere within the Kantian
system, even for animals, the implications of that move for the Analytic
need to be appraised (Hanna 2011: 409). In short, how can (i) be
true given (ii)?
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The article has two stages. First, in section 2 I offer a new account
of the relations between intuition, consciousness and perception in Kant’s
work. I argue that this supports nonconceptualism both by ﬂeshing
out his picture of nonconceptual intentionality and by clarifying
the limitations which he saw as inherent in such intentionality. Second,
in sections 3–4 I focus on the categories and the principles. I argue here
that nonconceptualism is compatible with the key thrust of the Deduction,
and can thus accommodate one of the main motivations for
conceptualism. In examining why that is the case, we will also see
why normally functioning, adult human intentionality necessarily involves
the categories.
Before getting underway, a few terminological and conceptual clariﬁ-
cations. Like Allais, my concern is with ‘relative nonconceptualism’, i.e.
with a nonconceptualism deﬁned in terms of the relation between
a mental state, namely an empirical intuition, and the subject to whom it
is ascribed (Speaks 2005: 360; Allais 2009: 386). I will not discuss
‘absolute nonconceptualism’, the thesis that there exists content which is
of ‘a different kind … than beliefs, thoughts, and so on’ (Speaks 2005:
360). I am sympathetic to the view that incongruent counterparts
demonstrate such content, but that requires discussion of topics –
particularly motor intentionality – to which I cannot do justice here.
More speciﬁcally, my concern is with the relationship between relative
nonconceptualism and the intentionality of empirical intuitions. In other
words, I agree that ‘a plausible nonconceptualist interpretation of Kant’
needs to establish the possibility of ‘perceptual images of objects in which
those objects are intentionally represented without being brought under
concepts’ (Ginsborg 2008: 68). Mere sensory awareness is not enough.
Posy makes the same point in a semantic idiom when he deﬁnes
conceptualism as the view that ‘without categorical principles, our
mental states cannot serve their semantic role as intuitions’ (Posy 2000:
165). There are, of course, foundational issues regarding intentionality
which I cannot address here: for example, whether perceptual content is
Fregean, Russellian or some form of Evansian hybrid, and I remain
neutral on these issues. Finally, conceptualism may take several forms.
Suppose that whilst empirical intuitions make an irreducible contribution
to intentionality, this is necessarily dependent on the contribution made
by concepts. This would sufﬁce to refute nonconceptualism as deﬁned.
One might also argue for a more radically conceptualist thesis whereby
intuitions are actually reducible to concepts. But since the less radical,
and surely exegetically more plausible, form of conceptualism would
sufﬁce to refute my position, I focus on it.
kant as both conceptualist and nonconceptualist
VOLUME 21 – 3 KANTIAN REVIEW | 369
Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000248
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. King's College London, on 09 Feb 2017 at 12:13:58, subject to the Cambridge
2. Intentionality, Consciousness and Perception: Kant’s
General Theory
This section sets out what I will call Kant’s ‘general theory’ of inten-
tionality, consciousness and perception. The theory is ‘general’ in that it
outlines certain structures common to both rational, sensible beings such
as humans and to non-rational, sensible animals. As he puts it himself:
[A]nimals also act in accordance with representations
(Vorstellungen) (and are not, as Descartes would have it,
machines), and in spite of their speciﬁc difference, they are still of
the same genus as human beings (as living beings). (KU, 5: 464)2
My presentation of the ‘general theory’ supports nonconceptualism in
two ways. First, and most obviously, it helps makes sense of Kant’s
thinking about the relation between humans and animals. As McLear
observes, it is ‘fairly uncontroversial that Kant believed non-human
animals incapable of conceptual capacities’ (McLear 2011: 4). But what
is striking is that Kant allows them far more than mere sensations. The
Jäsche Logic, for example, states that animals are ‘acquainted with
objects’ (kennen Gegenstände) and can ‘represent something in
comparison with other things both as to sameness and as to difference’;
what they lack is only the ability to ‘cognize’ (erkennen), a capacity
which requires both intuition and concept (Log, 9: 64–5; KrV, A106).
Elsewhere Kant suggests that an ox has an outer sense intuition of its
stall (SvF, 2: 59), and it is obviously hard to deny that animals are capable
of representing, in at least a simplistic manner, the spatial movements
of their prey (Allais 2009: 407). Second, the ‘general theory’ clariﬁes
aspects of Kant’s model of synthesis. This is important because that
model is often taken to support conceptualism (for example, Posy 2000:
172). Kant himself states that ‘all combination is an action of the
understanding’ and that apperception is ‘the source of all combination’
(KrV, B130; cf. B134–5, 154). As I will argue in both this section and
the next, however, the interaction between different modes of synthesis
is signiﬁcantly more nuanced than this suggests.
I will now set out the ‘general theory’; I then come back to its implications
for nonconceptualism at the close of this section.
I begin with the empirical intuitions of outer sense: these represent
‘objects as outside us and all as in space’ (KrV, A22/B37). Within the set
of such intuitions, Kant distinguishes between those which are conscious
and those which are unconscious: the latter class, he stresses, is the
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larger (Anth., 7: 136). He introduces the relevant notion of consciousness
using the following example: if I perceive a man, I must also represent
those parts that constitute him ‘since the representation of the whole… is
composed of these partial ideas’ (Anth., 7: 135). However, I am not
typically conscious of those parts: I may see a man’s face ‘even though
I am not conscious of seeing his eyes, nose, mouth etc.’ (Anth., 7: 135).
Kant refers to conscious mental states as ‘perceptions’ (KrV, A320/
B376–7).3 Intuitions which are conscious are thus ‘objective perceptions’,
objective in that they ‘refer’ (sich beziehen) to an object (Gegenstand)
(ibid.). I discuss the links between this formulation and talk of ‘cognition’
at the start of section 3.
Before proceeding further, it is worth focusing on ‘perception’. In the
contemporary literature on nonconceptualism, ‘perception’ refers to
sense perception, i.e. what we hear, see, taste, etc. Thus Heck’s injunction
to ‘consider your current perceptual state’, mentioned above, is followed
by a list of things he can see (Heck 2000: 489–50). But Kant’s use is quite
different: perception is a ‘representation with consciousness’ (KrV, A320/
B376–7), and that is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient for sense perception
in the ordinary sense. It is not sufﬁcient since a consciously occurrent
thought about my house is a perception in Kant’s terms, and it is not
necessary since visual content may, as in the Anthropology example, be
unconscious and thus not ‘perceptual’ in the Kantian sense. Nevertheless,
the two meanings are not simply orthogonal to each other: empirical
intuitions of outer sense, for example, are roughly analogous to
perceptions in contemporary usage, and insofar as they are conscious
these will also be perceptions in Kant’s sense. For clarity’s sake, I will
use ‘perception’ only in its Kantian sense.
Kant’s distinction between conscious and unconscious representational
content raises an obvious question: what determines what I am conscious
of? This can clearly vary: most of us are not typically conscious of other
people’s eyebrows, yet we may obviously become so (perhaps on reading
that sentence). To answer this question, we need to turn to Kant’s
account of time. Kant deﬁnes time as ‘nothing but the form of inner sense,
i.e. of the intuition of ourself and our inner state’ (KrV, A33/B49). Time is
thus one of the ‘conditions of receptivity of our mind’ (KrV, A77/102).
To be precise, it is the form in which ‘we intuit ourselves only as we are
internally affected by ourselves’ (KrV, B156, original emphasis). In short,
‘inner sense’ is ‘nothing but the way in which the mind is affected by its
own activity’ (KrV, B67–8). Many issues regarding inner sense require
clariﬁcation: consider the familiar question of whether Kant recognizes
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a manifold of content over and above that received from outer sense. But
what matters here is the primary claim regarding self-affection. For one
clear instance of what Kant means, consider categorical synthesis,
a spontaneous act which is both exercised on the spatial manifold and
in which we thereby ‘intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected’
(KrV, B153). Crucially, in line with the doctrine of inner sense, it is this act
of self-affection which ﬁrst produces an awareness of temporal succession.
[W]e cannot even represent time itself without, in drawing
a straight line (which has to serve as the external ﬁgurative
representation of time), attending merely to the action of the
synthesis of the manifold…Motion, as the action of the subject
(not as a determination of an object), consequently the synthesis
of the manifold in space … ﬁrst produces the concept of
succession. (KrV, B154–5; similarly B292)
Kant’s point is that it is the action of the subject, in drawing a line, which
yields an awareness of succession. Unsurprisingly, the Analytic focuses on
the sophisticated self-affection of rational agents. But I believe that Kant
regards this basic model as applying much more widely. Speciﬁcally, Kant
sees temporal succession in both rational and non-rational beings as the
form in which those beings intuit their own determination of the spatial
manifold. Of course, Kant’s treatment of animals is often deeply unclear:
for example, he occasionally denies that animals possess inner sense
(V-MP-L1/Pölitz, 28: 276). I agree with McLear that the price of taking
this kind of remark, which arises from the elision of apperception and
inner sense, at face value is too high: inner sense is the form of time, and ‘it
seems scarcely credible to attribute conscious awareness of any sort to
animalswhen that awareness is not temporally structured’ (McLear 2011: 9).
But one can nevertheless discern Kant’s position, at least in the Critical
period, fairly clearly: time is the form inwhich beings intuit self-affection, and
the principal case of such self-affection is the act of changing the scope of
conscious awareness of the spatial manifold, an act which will occur in
more or less sophisticated guises depending on the creature involved. This is
the heart of what I called Kant’s ‘general theory’.
To support this reading, I will examine two key texts; I will then spell out
the implications for nonconceptualism. The ﬁrst text is the discussion of
the synthesis of apprehension in the A Deduction.
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however
would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish
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the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for as
contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything
other than absolute unity. (KrV, A99)
The place to begin is the ﬁnal clause. As contained in ‘one moment’, the
intuition is an ‘absolute unity’; elsewhere Kant refers to it as a ‘synopsis’
‘which contains a manifold’ (KrV, A97) and as a ‘quantum’, i.e. that
which ‘I can cognize immediately’ (V-MP/Dohna, 28: 630). I agree with
Tolley that the point about ‘absolute unity’ cannot be that intuitions
given ‘in one moment’ are entirely unarticulated – or else it would be
impossible to instantly see two things as standing next to each other
(Tolley 2013: 122). Rather, it is that such ‘absolute’ empirical intuitions
are not themselves products of synthesis; these empirical representations,
for example the man standing in the ﬁeld, are directly and immediately
generated by our being affected through ‘outer sense’. (One might think,
separately, that the pure forms of space and time depend on some
synthesis; my point here concerns individual empirical intuitions –
I return to the pure forms at the end of the section.) Such an absolute or
instantaneous intuition ‘contains a manifold in itself’ because, like all
intuitions, it is inﬁnitely divisible (KrV, A169/B211). However, insofar as
the intuition is considered at only a single point in time, this manifold is
‘not represented as such’, i.e. it is present but we are not conscious of
it – precisely as in the example of the man’s eyes in theAnthropology. The
reason is that an awareness of the parts, i.e. a shift in the scope of
conscious awareness, necessarily implies an awareness of succession: the
manifold is thus only ‘represented as such’ insofar we ‘distinguish the
time in the succession of impressions’ Why? The answer is that this is
precisely the claim regarding the connection between consciousness and
time that I discussed above: succession is the form in which we intuit
our own act of ‘attention’, of shifting the scope of conscious awareness
(KrV, B156). Conversely in the absence of an awareness of succession,
i.e. when dealing with an intuition ‘as contained in one moment’, we lack
consciousness of its parts. In short, the ‘synthesis of apprehension’ is the
process whereby I come to consciously represent the parts of something
rather than merely to intuit them, i.e. to objectively perceive them in the
language of KrV, A320/B376–7. Thus ‘by the synthesis of apprehension
I understand the composition of the manifold of an empirical
intuition, through which perception, i.e. empirical consciousness
of it (as appearance), becomes possible’ (KrV, B160). Such changes
of conscious awareness are acts intuited under the form of time:
thus ‘the apprehension of the manifold … is always successive’ (KrV,
A189/B234).
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The other text I want to adduce in support of my account is the treatment
of magnitude in KU. There Kant begins by discussing the extent
of the conscious spatial awareness that one has at a given instant,
what one ‘can grasp at a single glance’ (in einem Blick fassen,
KU, 5: 254). Kant refers to this extent as the ‘basic measure’ and
gives various examples of it, such as an area the height of a man (KU,
5: 256). In the case of rational agents, shifts in the scope of such
conscious awareness are partly a function of the concepts I possess: when
I acquire the concept of racism, for example, I attend to different aspects
of the same scene. In animals, in contrast, the scope of conscious
awareness, and the shifts in it, are determined by an imagination
governed by natural laws (KU, 5: 251–2). We thus have two types of
motion and two types of attention: rational and non-rational. So, as
I read it, passages such as the following, whilst primarily concerned
with apperceptive motion, are also speaking simultaneously of a broader
phenomenon: ‘I do not see how one can ﬁnd so many difﬁculties in
the fact that inner sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention
can give us an example of this’ (KrV, B156, original emphasis). This
is precisely what I am claiming: the act of attention, of focusing in,
which may take more or less sophisticated forms, affects inner sense,
resulting in an awareness of succession KrV, B67–8). To put it another
way, the ‘motion of the subject’, the act of shifting the scope of
consciousness, may be more or less determined: in non-rational agents
‘motion’ is caused by natural laws, whilst in rational agents it may be
self-initiated to a greater degree (spontaneity) or even to an absolute
degree (autonomy).
Suppose the model I have outlined has something going for it; if one
wishes to reject it, an alternative account of Kant’s views on the scope of
conscious awareness, motion, perception and so on would be needed.
What are its consequences for nonconceptualism?
First, we have a better grip on the relation between animals and humans.
As stated in section 1, I remain neutral on how exactly the content of
animal intentionality is to be understood, for example whether it is
Russellian. But what we are dealing with is something more than mere
sensation, which is deliberately placed on a lower level of Kant’s ‘ladder’
(KrV, A320/B376; Log, 9: 64–5). Instead, the animal’s engagement with
the world includes a conscious and unconscious representation of spatial
entities within what Allais neatly calls an ‘egocentric frame of reference or
phenomenal ﬁeld’.4 The dog sees the bowl as to its left and nearer than
the wall; he then focuses in on its parts, perhaps the dark-coloured
sacha golob
374 | KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 21 – 3
Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000248
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. King's College London, on 09 Feb 2017 at 12:13:58, subject to the Cambridge
portion which he associates with food. In humans, the situation is
more complex. Just as with the dog, our act of shifting the scope of
conscious awareness to become aware of the parts of an empirical
intuition necessarily generates an awareness of succession. Unlike the
dog, however, those acts are governed by concepts: we possess ‘rules for
apprehension’ (KrV, A103–4; Reﬂ., 16: 557). In short, the very same
basic framework that underlies empirical intuitions, perception, succes-
sion in the human case also underlies the nonconceptual intentionality of
animals; the far-reaching and important differences between the
two cases, such as concept possession, need to be seen against the
backdrop of these shared structures. One way to express this is by
distinguishing two notions of consciousness. The motion of non-rational
subjects makes intuitional states conscious in the sense exempliﬁed
by the Anthropology’s example of seeing the man at a distance and then
gradually becoming conscious of the parts of his face. In rational beings,
the manner in which we become conscious of the world is inter-deﬁned
with a second order capacity to become ‘conscious of’ our own repre-
sentations, i.e. to be self-conscious or apperceptive. This does not mean,
of course, that we typically go round thinking about representations;
the claim is rather that when I become conscious of the table,
I have a second-order awareness of the marks of that intuition as standing
in various inferential relations, relations which I recognize are not
simply a matter of my own psychological history, but are instead
presumptively grounded in the thing and so presumptively valid for other
agents too (KrV, A106, 126, B142, A197/B242–3; GMS, 4: 412;
Reﬂ., 16: 663).5 But such concepts operate within the same underlying
framework of intuition, attention, shifts of conscious awareness, inner
sense, etc.
Second, we have a clearer view of how nonconceptual synthesis might
work. Animal intentionality is based on the interaction between appre-
hensive synthesis and associative reproduction. This is because there
must be some mechanism for allowing the successive intuitions generated
by shifts in attention to inform each other – otherwise they would simply
lie ‘dispersed and separate in the mind’ (KrV, A120). In animals, this
mechanism is associative imagination (KrV, A120). As Kant puts it,
‘if I consider myself as an animal’, representations ‘could still carry on
their play in an orderly fashion, as connected according to empirical laws
of association’ (Br., 11: 52).
In rational agents, as I discuss in section 4, there is a more sophisticated
unifying mechanism in play – the understanding. Before getting to
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that, however, it is worth comparing my position with two prominent
alternatives: Tolley’s and Waxman’s.
Tolley defends a version of nonconceptualism in which, whilst there are
nonconceptual intuitions, there is no nonconceptual synthesis (Tolley
2013). I absolutely agree with Tolley that there can be an intuitive
intentional content which is not the product of synthesis: this is the
‘absolute unity’ of A99 (Tolley 2013: 122). But I disagree on four issues.
First, I regard this as an exceptional limit case. Both apprehension and
association are basic activities, characteristic of a primitive capacity
for investigating the world. I thus disagree with Tolley’s view that non-
synthetic intentionality is the only form of nonconceptual representation
recognized by Kant (Tolley 2013: 121–2). Second, Tolley’s rejection of
nonconceptual synthesis forces him to equate perception, as it ﬁgures in
the discussion of apprehension in A99, with the type of reﬂective, second-
order awareness characteristic of Kantian concepts (Tolley 2013: 110,
123–4). This intellectualist gloss on perception clashes directly with texts
such as Log., 9: 64–5 and KrV, A320/B376–7 where the term clearly
means merely conscious awareness. Another way to put the point is that
Tolley’s reading conﬂates the weak sense of ‘consciousness’ discussed in
the previous paragraph with the strong, apperceptive sense. Third, Tolley
states that his rejection of nonconceptual synthesis is based on passages
such asKrV, B130, where Kant states that ‘all combination is an action of
the understanding’ (Tolley 2013: 121–2). But it is going too far to say
that such remarks ‘stiﬂe any hope for carving out space for a kind of
synthesis that does not involve concepts’ (Tolley 2013: 122). One option
is to stress that Kant is here deﬁning ‘understanding’ in opposition to
sensibility. Since sensibility is that which is purely passive (KrV, A51/
B75), it is possible that ‘understanding’ is being used broadly to
encompass any active rearrangement of the manifold, and not just the
sophisticated forms of such characteristic of rational agents – so, for
example, A120 identiﬁes the imagination as ‘an active faculty’. Another
option is to accept that ‘understanding’ at B130 does indeed refer to
conceptual awareness, but to argue that what Kant really means is that
combination across all forms of content, including that of the sensible
manifold, may be determined by the action of the understanding. Again,
this is not special pleading: many passages show how hard Kant was
ﬁnding it to articulate his views (consider the vacillations over the status
of the imagination and synthesis at KrV, A78 and B130). Finally, there is
strong evidence from other writings that Kant allows animals associative
synthesis (for example, Br., 11: 52; V-MP-L1/Pölitz, 28: 275–7; V-MP/
Dohna, 28: 689–90). Assuming that we must deny animals the reﬂective
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and inferential capacities of the ‘I think’ (Anth., 7: 127) and thus concepts
(KrV, A341/399), it follows that such synthesis must be nonconceptual.
On balance, it thus seems right to recognize nonconceptual synthesis
within Kant’s philosophy. What I have tried to show is how closely tied
such synthesis is to his general theory of perception, of consciousness,
and of the awareness of succession.
Turning to Waxman’s reading, there are again notable points of
agreement: for example, I think he is right to present pure intuition as
answering what is often known as the ‘binding problem’, i.e. the question
of how multiple sensory data streams can be united in a ‘super-ﬁeld’
(Waxman 2013: 97). I am neutral on his distinctive appeal to a ‘non-
discursive’ apperception, although I amwary as to whether we have a good
enough grip on this idea for it to do real explanatory work (Waxman 2013:
141). But he and I disagree on three fundamental points. First, Waxman
sees sensibility, considered in abstraction from concepts, as radically
impoverished. In the absence of concepts: ‘sensibility contributes neither
order nor relation to the manifolds of space and time, it can do nothing to
differentiate and determine each space and each time’ (Waxman 2013: 11).
The result is what Waxman describes as Kant’s ‘self-created problem’,
namely that:
[E]xperience itself would be impossible if the sensible existents
encountered in it were devoid of all spatial and temporal
differentiation and determination; and since this is precisely
what they lack given only the unity of sensibility made possible
by pure sensible intuition, this want must be made good by pure
understanding, by means of its pure concepts, or not at all.
(Waxman 2013: 368)
I agree that without conceptual capacities one cannot enjoy experience in
the thick sense of ‘cognition’, nor represent ‘objects’ where that notion is
deﬁned in terms of rules (Waxman 2013: 364). But it appears that
Waxman also endorses the stronger view that sensibility by itself is unable
to present relations such as egocentric distance, or to sustain the differ-
entiation of items by spatiotemporal position: this alone makes sense of his
talk of nonconceptualized appearances as ‘devoid of all spatial and tem-
poral differentiation and determination’. Yet that strong view renders it
impossible to understand the behaviour of animals, which are evidently
capable of distinguishing and tracking the closer of two food sources.
Second, I believe that Waxman misidentiﬁes the role of apprehension. For
him, apprehension generates these impoverished appearances, ‘devoid of all
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relation among themselves’: this is his explicit gloss on Kant’s claim atKrV,
A120 that its outputs are ‘dispersed and separate’ (Waxman 2013: 150).
But Kant’s point is more subtle. The outputs of apprehension typically
include intuitions with relational spatial content: the dog sees ‘at a glance’
the intruder by the door (KU, 5: 254). Such intuitions are dispersed only
because shifts in conscious awareness generate, as described above, an
experience of succession. Third, Waxman places an impossible burden on
the understanding: ‘only by grasping how very little Kantian sensibility is
able to set in place ahead of the understanding can one hope to appreciate
the hugeness of the void the latter is obliged to ﬁll by means of its pure
concepts’ (Waxman: 2013: 118, original emphasis). Suppose I perceive two
pillars: why do I intuit them beside each other and not behind one another?
It surely cannot be the understanding’s task to determine this: the categories
are compatible with either option. Dialectically, it is striking that Waxman
justiﬁes this as necessary for the success of the Deduction: granting such an
extensive role to understanding constitutes ‘Kant’s sole and entire warrant’
for ‘the objective validity of the categories’ (Waxman 2013: 372). As I will
show in sections 3–4, however, this is not the case.
To complete the overall story of this section, my discussion of empirical
intuitions would need supplementation by a treatment of space and time
as pure intuitions. That is, unfortunately, beyond this article, but one can
see how that chapter might be told. Animals would have a primitive
awareness of the pure forms within which individual empirical intuitions
occur. This primitive awareness could be cashed in terms of open-ended
motor intentional dispositions: insofar as the prey keeps running left, the
animal will keep running left. Rational agents alone are able to develop
more sophisticated representations of space and time as a whole, such as
Newtonian mechanics.
Kant’s ‘general theory’ as set out here generates certain systemic
limitations on intuitive content – crudely, the price of shifts in conscious
awareness is that the relevant intuitions are given as successive and thus
‘dispersed and separate in the mind’ (KrV, A120). To remedy this, some
‘combination ... is therefore needed’ (KrV, A120). I now turn to the
distinctive combinatorial capacities of rational agents.
3. Transition to the Deduction and the Principles
This section introduces the relationship between the categories,
the principles and nonconceptualism. I ﬁrst make explicit some
methodological assumptions, and then offer some preliminary remarks
about the Deduction.
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It is a familiar point that many Kantian texts admit of both conceptualist
and nonconceptualist readings. For example, the famous dictum that
‘intuitions without concepts are blind’ supports conceptualism if ‘blind’ is
read as ‘lacking intentional content’ (Falkenstein 1995: 58). For non-
conceptualists, however, the point becomes clear a few lines later when
Kant states that only from the union of understanding and intuition can
cognition arise: ‘blind’ thus simply means ‘falling short of the higher
standards required for cognition’where cognition implies both intuitions
and concepts (Hanna 2011: 405). More generally, the nonconceptualist
can always grant that high-level achievements require conceptual
capacities, whilst insisting that a state might nevertheless remain an
empirical intuition despite falling short of that standard. The same move
is possible if one frames the debate in terms of ‘objects’: there are texts
which clearly invite a reading on which objectivity is separable from
conceptuality, as the nonconceptualist believes. For example: ‘To make
a concept, by means of an intuition, into a cognition of an object, is
indeed the work of judgment; but the reference of an intuition to an
object in general (die Beziehung der Anschauung auf ein Object
überhaupt) is not’ (Br., 11: 310–11).
The question, of course, is how we should understand this notion of
objectivity and how it relates to passages which align objects with rules
and concepts (KrV, A201/B246). Again one sees texts pushing both ways.
The same point can even be made with respect to ‘cognition’ itself. Whilst
the dominant usage in Kant’s work is undoubtedly one according to
which cognition requires both intuition and concepts, the Stufenleiter
passage states that a cognition ‘is either an intuition or a concept’
(entweder Anschauung oder Begriff), phrasing which allows non-
conceptualists like Hanna to claim that Kant is torn between a broad and
narrow use of Erkenntnis, with only the latter requiring conceptual
capacities (Hanna 2005: 256). To take one more case, passages such
as KrV, A89–91/B122–3 are prima facie clear endorsements of non-
conceptualism. The issue is whether we should read them at face value or
as mere possibilities that the Deduction ultimately shows to be incoherent
(Hanna 2011: 404–5; Grifﬁth 2010: 199). In short, the issue of Kantian
nonconceptualism cannot be settled by any catalogue of texts since
one’s stance on any speciﬁc passage will both form and be formed by
one’s broader views on issues such as synthesis, the Deduction, the status
of animals, etc.
I nowwant to turn to the Deduction. I cannot mention, let alone treat, each
aspect of Kant’s argument. Instead, I focus on one of its central aims, and
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one which is directly related to the question of nonconceptualism. The
Deduction aims to establish the objective validity of the categories; more
speciﬁcally, Kant aims to establish certain a priori, necessary and synthetic
principles valid of ‘all objects of experience’ (KrV, B161). As a transcen-
dental argument, the Deduction proceeds by demonstrating that these
principles are a necessary condition for something (A783/B811). Let us call
this something, whatever it is, Premise. Kant himself sometimes speaks of
Premise in terms of ‘experience’, sometimes in terms of ‘objects’, but this
alone does not advance matters since the nonconceptualist will simply
claim that ‘experience’ and ‘objects’ here refer to sophisticated states, well
beyond mere intentionality (so, for example, KrV, A106, B137). But the
following can surely be agreed by all: it is a necessary condition on Kant’s
argument being viable that Premise, whatever it is, is not itself more
problematic than the categories. After all, the dialectical structure of Kant’s
transcendental argument requires that one begins from something which
his opponents grant, and then progresses to some hitherto unnoticed
condition of that. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that those
opponents to whom Kant is speaking include empiricists such as Hume
(Prol., 4: 257; KrV, B168). The result is an adequacy condition on the
Deduction: Premise must be something which such empiricists either
accept or can be brought to accept comparatively easily.
I will now sketch a simple proposal on which the Deduction, so
read, remains entirely compatible with nonconceptualism: categorical
synthesis is not necessary for empirical intuitions per se, but only for
the representation of a special class of relations among such intuitions.
In Kantian terms, they are necessary only for a certain mode of
uniﬁcation or synthesis.6 In short: ‘The possibility of cognizing a priori
through categories whatever objects may come before our senses, not as
far as the form of their intuition, but rather as far as the laws of their
combination are concerned … is to be explained’ (KrV, B159–60,
emphasis added).
Speciﬁcally, I think that the categories provide a way to re-establish complex
relations among the necessarily successive perceptions generated by appre-
hension, as discussed in section 2. The same point can be expressed by
distinguishing two senses of ‘object’.7 Kant’s system allows animals to
perceive spatiotemporal particulars; such states thus have an ‘intentional
object’ as that phrase is used in the phenomenological and analytic literature
on the philosophy of mind. What I am denying is that they have an ‘object’
in the sense employed in texts such asKrV, A197/B242, where it functions as
a term for those distinctive modes of categorical combination.8
sacha golob
380 | KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 21 – 3
Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415416000248
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. King's College London, on 09 Feb 2017 at 12:13:58, subject to the Cambridge
To introduce this proposal, consider the case where it is most natural, the
Second Analogy. In line with section 2, Kant begins by stating that ‘[t]he
apprehension of the manifold is always successive’ (KrV, A189/B234).
The question immediately arises as to how we are able to represent the
difference between two relations: successive perception and perception of
succession. Kant’s answer is that we must represent the latter as governed
by some form of causal bond. This exhibits precisely the dialectical
structure I noted: it is effective against the empiricist given the plausible
assumption that she recognizes our ability to at least represent the
distinction between an event and a successive perception of two
unchanged, simultaneously existing, objects. After all, debates between
positivistic, projectivist and sceptical realist accounts of the Treatise
are debates over what must be added to events in order to generate
causality.9 As Longuenesse observes, ‘Kant maintains that some repre-
sentation of causal relation, rather than resulting – as Hume claimed –
from the repeated perception of generically identical successions of events,
is presupposed in the very representation of any particular objective
succession’ (Longuenesse 2005: 143).10 In the case of animals, in contrast, it
seems more reasonable to speculate that they possess empirical intuitions,
a series of images of a ship for example, while lacking precisely the ability to
posit certain sophisticated relations among those images, relations such as
the distinction between subjective and objective succession.11 In short, the
success of the Second Analogy as an anti-empiricist transcendental
argument is compatible with nonconceptualism.
The Second Analogy is thus a natural ﬁt with my approach. But one
might worry that this very naturalness is problematic.12 After all,
many Kantians, irrespective of their views on conceptualism, might be
sympathetic to what I have said about that particular text. There are two
points to be made. First, there are commentators who explicitly state
that categorical synthesis is a necessary condition on the empirical
presentation of spatiotemporal particulars (Grifﬁth 2010: 194, Ginsborg
2008: 70). Even the limited remarks made so far suggest that they are
mistaken – the Second Analogy presents causality as necessary only
for the representation of specialised relations between such particulars.
Second, I began with the Second Analogy because it is the easiest ground
on which to run my proposal. As I discuss in section 4, matters become
really interesting when one expands it to the mathematical categories.
I have argued that this approach to the Deduction is compatible with non-
conceptualism; animals may possess intuitive content in the complete absence
of conceptual capacities. But it is important to stress, equally, the implications
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for the human case; insofar as humans represent the relevant relations, it
follows that they necessarily deploy the categories. It is worth contrasting my
approach to existing nonconceptualist attempts to accommodate the
Deduction. Take the case of Allais: the fundamental difference between Allais
and me concerns when and how the categories become necessary. She writes:
[T]he Deduction is speciﬁcally concerned with one aspect of
cognition: the conditions under which we can apply concepts to
objects in judgments… in the Deduction, he wants to show that
a priori concepts are necessary conditions of being able to apply
empirical concepts in empirical judgments. (Allais 2011: 102,
original emphasis)
Kant was certainly sometimes attracted to this approach (KrV, A111,
A93/B126). Furthermore, Allais’s strategy has similarities to my own:
both hold that the categories are necessary only for the representation of
a ‘special kind of unity’ (Allais 2011: 105). But there are crucial differ-
ences. For Allais the warrant for the application of the categories is that
they are ‘the conditions under which we can apply concepts to objects in
judgments’: the distinctive unity which the categories make possible is the
unity characteristic of empirical concepts and related notions such as
‘property’ or ‘general feature’ (Allais 2011: 103–4). As a result,
Allais’s view faces two difﬁculties. First, it damages the Deduction as
a transcendental argument. Hume will not accept the premise of Allais’s
argument: he will argue, as Berkeley does, that there is no need to
postulate anything like Kantian empirical concepts in the ﬁrst place – all
that is needed is a tendency to associate groups of particular images
(Hume 1978: 1.1.7.7–8). Of course, Hume may be wrong about that.
But my model shows the categories to be necessary for something that is
not itself a philosophical hypothesis, but rather a basic datum of any
recognisably human awareness of the world. ‘No one’, Kant states,
will fail to recognize the difference between the ship and the house case
(KrV, A190/B235); the sceptic might insist that we are universally
mistaken, always seeing as successive what is really simultaneous, but she
cannot plausibly deny that we have the resources to at least represent
the distinction. Second, it is hard to see why the categories should be
‘necessary conditions of being able to apply empirical concepts in
empirical judgments’ (Allais 2011: 102). Empirical concept formation
certainly requires that objects and properties exhibit a reasonable degree
of coherence (KrV, A100–1). But why should it require anything as
strong as the existence of causal laws? Of course, there is a long-standing
debate over the strength of arguments like the Analogies. My point is that
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Allais’s approach creates a structural problem insofar as it premises the
categories on something bound to imply only a weaker result. One might
respond by ‘thickening’ empirical concepts, but this will simply exacer-
bate the ﬁrst difﬁculty: the more plausible it becomes that empirical
concepts imply categorical order, the more the warranted application of
those empirical concepts themselves becomes open to question. In sum,
on my reading the categories are necessary for some achievement more
basic than on Allais’s account; I return to this at the end of section 4.
4. The Categories and Relational Synthesis: The Axioms
The task now is to develop the proposal of section 3: I use the example of
the categories of quantity as detailed in the Axioms. I choose the Axioms
for several reasons: it is, for example, appealed to by Grifﬁth in defence of
conceptualism.13 But the most important is that, whilst the text of the
Axioms supports my claims, it also shows why Kant’s position has been
misunderstood. Speciﬁcally, Kant is torn between two lines of argument,
a problem rooted in the distinction between the mathematical and
dynamical categories, and one which explains some of the textual issues
that obscure his nonconceptualism.
The Axioms aims to demonstrate that ‘[a]ll intuitions are extensive
magnitudes’ (KrV, B202), or that ‘[a]ll appearances are, as regards their
intuition, extensive magnitudes’ (KrV, A161). I use the former formula-
tion, but I do not regard the two as differing signiﬁcantly. Kant deﬁnes an
extensive magnitude as follows: ‘I call an extensive magnitude that in
which the representation of the parts makes possible the representation of
the whole (and therefore necessarily precedes the latter)’ (KrV, A162/
B203). The issue in play is thus mereology. At the level of the pure forms of
intuition, of course, the whole has priority over the parts (KrV, A22/B38).
But here we are dealing with empirical intuitions, and Kant’s claim is that,
in such cases, the representation of the parts has explanatory priority over
the representation of the whole. Now, as stated, I believe Kant developed
two very different arguments for this claim. I label these the ‘simple
argument’ and the ‘complex argument’, and I address them in turn.
The simple argument is encapsulated in the text beginning the A Edition
of the Axioms:
I can represent no line to myself, no matter how small, without
drawing it in thought, that is gradually generating all its parts
from a point, and thereby ﬁrst registering this intuition. ... every
appearance as intuition is an extensive magnitude, as it can only
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be cognised through successive synthesis (from part to part) in
apprehension. (KrV, A162–3/B203–4)
If we can represent an empirical intuition only by successively moving
from ‘part to part’, it immediately follows, as the Axioms claims, that the
representation of the parts has explanatory priority over the representa-
tion of the whole.
This simple argument aims to build on the theory of perception discussed
in section 2: one sees the characteristic link between apprehension, i.e.
changes in the scope of conscious awareness, and the awareness of
succession. But the simple argument is fatally ﬂawed. First, no
justiﬁcation is given for the premise that I ‘can represent no line to myself,
no matter how small, without… generating all its parts from a point’. It
seems phenomenologically undeniable that I can at least sometimes see a
whole line at a single glance. Second, the simple argument leaves spatial
perception radically underdetermined. Suppose I successively perceive
a series of points. Why should I take them to form a straight line, as
opposed to a bent one, if I can never see the line as a whole? Yet if
I can represent the line as a whole, then why could I not do this prior to
perceiving the parts? Third, the simple argument generates a regress
since, given Kant’s other assumptions, any part is divisible and so must
itself have been arrived at by a successive perception of its parts. Fourth,
even if the argument were sound, it is unclear how it would link to the
categories: no direct mention has been made of them.
The underlying problem is that the simple argument relies on an extreme
version of the account of perception outlined in section 2. The point there
was that shifts in the scope of conscious awareness, for example when
perceiving the parts of something, necessarily create an awareness of
succession. But this is perfectly compatible with the fact that we can,
and initially do, simply perceive objects without needing to ‘gradually
generate’ their parts; as I discussed in section 2, KU appeals to the
‘basic measure’ precisely to emphasize that one may intuit something
instantaneously, in a single glance (KU, 5: 251, 254).14 Nevertheless, the
simple argument remains important because it explains an otherwise
troubling aspect of the Deduction. If the simple argument worked, it
would entail that any intuition was an extensive magnitude just in virtue
of the way it is perceived, i.e. through a successive synthesis of its parts.
The only difference between a human and an animal would then be that
the former was additionally capable of reﬂecting on and recognizing this
fact. This, I suggest, is what Kant has in mind when he claims that
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the proof of the mathematical categories has a distinctive kind of
‘immediate evidence’ and ‘intuitive certainty’ (KrV, A160–2/B199–201).
This same idea explains the prima facie conceptualist remarks found in
§26 of the Deduction. For example: ‘all synthesis, through which even
perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories’ (KrV,
B161). Clearly the nonconceptualist owes some account of this line. My
suggestion is that it is driven by the simple argument, by the assumption
that at least some categories might ﬂow directly from the mere act of
apprehension. But the simple argument is deeply ﬂawed, and, as I now
show, it does not reﬂect Kant’s considered position.
I now outline the second proof of the Axioms: the ‘complex argument’.
The place to begin is §26 of the Deduction where Kant discusses the
distinctive unity which the categories bring to perception. Note that he is
now talking speciﬁcally about himself, about human perception:
If I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception
through apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the neces-
sary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition in general.…
This very same synthetic unity, however, if I abstract from the
form of space, has its seat in the understanding and is the
category of the synthesis of the homogenous in an intuition in
general, i.e. the category of quantity, with which that synthesis
of apprehension, i.e. the perception, must therefore be in
thoroughgoing agreement. (KrV, B162)
Kant is explaining here how the category can act as a ‘rule for
apprehension’, a mechanism for unifying the necessarily successive and
so ‘dispersed’ perceptions generated by apprehension (Reﬂ., 16: 557,
KrV, A120). This immediately involves a far more sophisticated appa-
ratus than the simple argument: note the references to homogeneity and
the category of quantity. The same applies to the B edition of the Axioms,
where the representation of determinate spaces and times is explained in
terms of ‘the composition of that which is homogenous … Now, the
consciousness of the homogeneous manifold in intuition in general,
insofar as through it the representation of an object ﬁrst becomes
possible, is the concept of a magnitude’ (KrV, B203).
I argued in section 3 that the categories re-establish complex relations
among the successive perceptions generated by apprehension. In the
Analogies, those relations are objective succession and simultaneity. I will
now argue that in the Axioms they are certain mereological relations.
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Suppose a dog sees a space X at t1: as described in KU, it intuits it at
a single glance (KU, 5: 254). At t2–t5 it becomes successively conscious
of the various parts of X, exactly as described in section 2. Now the
animal may associate these parts with the house originally seen at t1:
seeing one part brings to mind another. It may also react differently to
different parts of an object: it licks only the corner of a bowl with food in
it. But what the animal lacks is the ability to see the parts as parts, just as
it lacks the ability to see something as a door (SvF, 2: 59). It lacks this
ability because representing that relation requires the categories of
quantity: as Kant puts it, the concepts of part and whole lie under those
categories (V-MP/Volckmann, 28: 423). To understand this and
complete the argument, we need to look to the Schematism.
In the Schematism, Kant explains the schema for quantity in terms of the
concept of number:
[T]he pure schema of magnitude, as a concept of the under-
standing, is number, a representation which compounds
[zusammenbefaßt] the successive addition of unit to (homo-
geneous) unit. Number is therefore simply the unity of the
synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general,
a unity due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of
the intuition. (KrV, A142–3/B182)
I cannot address the general distinction between categories and their
schemata, nor the issue of how exactly the three categories of quantity
relate to the single schema of number.15 Instead, my interest is in the
basic claim that number allows the ‘compounding’ of a manifold of
homogeneous units. In section 2 I noted that Kant uses ‘basic measure’ to
denote the scope of spatial consciousness at a given instant. But in
rational beings, this same awareness plays an additional role: it serves as
‘a measure or unity in estimating magnitude by numbers’ (KU, 5: 251).
To see the relevance, suppose now that I see spatial extent X at t1.
I perform the synthesis of apprehension, changing the scope of conscious
awareness to generate a successive perception at t2–t5 of its smaller parts.
So far this is just as with the dog. However, unlike the dog I possess the
schema for number: I recognize the parts as ‘homogeneous intuitions’, i.e.
I recognize them as falling under a common concept (V-MP-K3E/
Arnoldt, 29: 991–2). Speciﬁcally, I am able to take X and use it as
a numerical base in terms of which the subsequent intuitions are
conceptualized: X is the ‘basic measure’ in both of the senses just noted.
So at t1 I represent a space as being size X, at t2 one as being size half X,
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at t3 one as being some small but indeterminate portion of X and so on.
Now to see the successive perceptions in these terms just is to represent
mereological relations among them: for example, I can recognize that if
I sum together the various parts it yields the original whole X. This
‘summing together’ is what the Schematism refers to as the act of
‘compounding’ made possible by the schema number. Recall: ‘the pure
schema of magnitude, as a concept of the understanding, is number,
a representation which compounds the successive addition of unit to
(homogeneous) unit’ (KrV, A142–3/B182; similarly A103).
It is this compounding of homogeneous units, i.e. successive parts
conceptualized in terms of an original extent that serves as a numerical
base, that animals cannot achieve. Whilst an image of one part may bring
to their mind an image of the whole, they are unable to represent the fact
that the whole is constituted out of those parts.16 They are unable to do
this because they lack the relevant a priori schema, number. Thus the
1793 Prize essay: ‘the representation of a composite, as such, is
not a mere intuition, but requires the concept of a composition
(Zusammensetzung) ... that is not abstracted from intuitions … but
is a basic concept, and a priori at that’ (FM, 20: 271). Similarly in a 1792
letter: ‘Composition (Zusammensetzung) itself cannot be given by means
of mere intuition and its apprehension, but only through the self-active
combination of themanifold… this combination and its functionmust be
subject to rules a priori in the mind’ (Br., 11: 376). In demonstrating
these results, Kant validates the headline claim of the Axioms, that all
intuitions are extensive magnitudes. But by itself that headline risks
oversimplifying matters. What the Axioms actually shows is that, for any
intuition, it is possible, given the schema for number, to recognize that it
is composed by the sum of its parts.
I now turn to some objections to my view. First, one might counter that if
a dog can perceive one item as to the left of another, surely it can perceive
one space, such as the couch, within a larger space, such as the room, and
so it can represent mereological relations. I am happy to grant this. My
claim is not that any representation involving part and whole relations
depends on the categories; the Aesthetic entails that even the ability to
perceive empirical intuitions is in some sense dependent on an ability to
represent space and time as wholes. Rather, my claim is that rational
agents alone are able to represent the whole as constituted or composed
by the sum of its parts. This is vital since it is a necessary condition on
being disposed to believe certain very basic claims. Such claims include: if
I replace a part with one of the same size, then the size of the whole will be
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unaffected; if I double the size of all parts, then the size of the whole will
double; if one part is removed from a whole, then the size of the
whole will be reduced by the size of that part. In short, composition is an
a priori concept as claimed in the Prize essay. I say more on how common
these dispositions are in response to the third objection below.
Second, one might question whether the proposal satisﬁes the demands
imposed on the Deduction in section 3. The key issue here is balance:
Kantian transcendental arguments need premises thin enough to be
accepted by his opponents, but thick enough to yield substantive con-
clusions. Have I got the balance right? Is the part–whole relation I have
identiﬁed both sophisticated enough that we can imagine an animal
intentionality which lacks it, thus supporting nonconceptualism, and yet
simple enough that it is assumed by Kant’s empiricist opponents? The
ﬁrst conjunct is easily met: it is unproblematic to imagine a dog exhibiting
differential reactions to the parts of an object, associating them together
and yet lacking the notion of composition. But what of the second? Both
Locke’s and Hume’s views on mereology are notoriously complex, and
I cannot offer a full treatment of them here. But I can do enough to make
the point. Consider, for example, this remark from the Treatise: ‘There is
another very decisive argument, which establishes the present doctrine
concerning our ideas of space and time, and is founded only on that
simple principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of parts, which
are indivisible’ (Hume 1978: 1.2.3.12, emphasis added). ‘Compounding’
here is precisely the ability to represent multiple subparts as constituting
a larger spatial whole, i.e. exactly that ability which the ‘complex
argument’ of the Axioms shows is dependent upon the category of
number. The result is that one can be a nonconceptualist and retain the
core aim of the Deduction: namely, to provide a revolutionary rationalist
response to empiricist sceptics.
Third, one might wonder if my account is really better off than that of
Allais. I argued that Allais’s reading of the Deduction was premised on
something that Kant’s opponents would not accept, namely empirical
concepts. But why do the dispositional capacities I am assuming not face
the same problem? After all, they sound like inferential abilities. Another
way to put the point: even if Hume himself recognized an act of com-
pounding, why can the empiricist not simply surrender that assumption?
My response to both points is that the empiricist can plausibly reject
explanatory hypotheses: he can, for example, reject the hypothesis that
our treatment of instances of a given type is informed by a generic
representation, such as a Kantian empirical concept, rather than a series
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of associated particular images. He can thus reject Allais’s premise as
discussed in section 3. But the empiricist cannot reject basic ﬁrst-order
data about human abilities, such as an ability to even represent the dis-
tinction between subjective and objective succession, between seeing the
parts of a house one after another, and seeing a ship sailing downstream.
Likewise, it is an unproblematic and everyday datum that normally
functioning, adult humans do possess the dispositional abilities
I emphasize: for example, a disposition to believe that if I double the size
of all parts, then the size of the whole will double. Whilst perhaps not
quite as obvious as the house/ship case, the presence of such dispositions
can be established by empirical testing at a comparatively young age
(I make no commitment as to exactly when – the issue is well modelled by
developmental psychology experiments in which children play with
blocks).17 Of course, the empiricist could simply dig her heels in and
insist that we still do not in fact possess those abilities, just as she could
insist we are not able even to represent any difference between the house
and ship cases. But in so doing empiricism collapses into a merely
dogmatic scepticism, which Kant has neither obligation nor ambition to
refute. In Hume’s own case, he would also have to abandon his classically
empiricist attempt to explain our representation of space and times as
wholes in terms of the sum of their parts.
I thus summarize the position reached. First, Kant is a nonconceptualist
in that he allows for empirical intuitions in the complete absence of
conceptual capacities; such intentionality is characteristic, for example,
of animals. Second, I have sought to accommodate some of the motiva-
tions for reading Kant as a conceptualist. In particular, in the case of
normally functioning, adult humans, empirical intuitions are necessarily
accompanied by categorical synthesis. I have also offered an explanation
as to why at least some passages suggest a cruder and more straightfor-
ward conceptualist picture, for example the ﬁrst Edition of the Axioms.18
Notes
1 This deﬁnition is in line with that used by Allais 2009: 384.
2 All references are to Kant 1902 using the following abbreviations: Anth. =
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht; Br. = Briefe; FM = Welches sind die
wirklichen Fortschritte [der] Metaphysik…?; GMS = Die Grundlegung zur Metaphy-
sik der Sitten; KrV = Kritik der reinen Vernunft; KU = Kritik der Urteilskraft; Log.
= Logik; NG = Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit
einzuführen; Prol. = Prolegomena; Reﬂ. = Reﬂexion; SvF = Die falsche
Spitzﬁndigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen; V-MP/Dohna = Metaphysik
Dohna; V-MP-L1/Pölitz = Metaphysik L1 Pölitz; V-MP/Volckmann = Metaphysik
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Volckmann; V-MP-K3E/Arnoldt = Metaphysik K3 Arnoldt. I have consulted,
although often modiﬁed, the translations in Kant 1991–.
3 ‘Consciousness’ (Bewuβtsein) is thus primarily a phenomenological term, identifying
a form of qualitative awareness: a conscious representation is one that is
‘illuminated’ (Anth., 7: 135). Unconscious intuitions retain their representational
structure but are ‘obscure’, with the result that we need to infer to our possession,
rather than having an immediate phenomenological awareness, of them (Anth., 7: 135;
NG, 2: 191).
4 Allais 2009: 408.
5 It is because of this ambiguity that some pre-Critical texts (e.g. V-MP/Dohna, 28:
689–90), deny animals ‘consciousness’ (for helpful discussion see McLear 2011).
6 The reference to ‘relations’ includes more than the three relational categories; my use
thus mirrors Kant’s own distinction between ‘the synthetic unity of the manifold’ and the
individual category of unity (KrV, B131).
7 I do not think that the Gegenstand/Objekt distinction maps this divide, nor do I think
that Kant deploys that distinction with any real uniformity (here I agree with
Longuenesse 1998: 111).
8 As detailed in section 3, a similar distinction between two senses of ‘object’ is made by
Allais – but the substance of my position is very different.
9 Without this assumed ability to identify objective succession, the Humean world would
collapse into incoherence. Suppose I repeatedly see two doors, A and B, as I walk
upstairs, and that I then see the same doors in the reverse order whenever I walk back
down: without a capacity to recognize them as simultaneously existing, which for Hume
is of course still delivered by imagination (Hume 1978: 1.2.4.24), I would be forced to
regard A and B as both cause and effect of each other.
10 I differ from Longuenesse, however, on the key issue of animals (Longuenesse 1998:
208n.).
11 Onemight argue that an animal can draw this distinction via its proprioceptive feeling of
bodily motion. I am sympathetic to this, but it marks a fundamental departure from a
Kantian approach: it suggests that one might recognize an event without seeing it as
caused simply by bodily orientation.
12 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this.
13 Grifﬁth 2010: 213–14.
14 Kant is often criticized for an implausible ‘data atomism’ (Beck 1978: 144). KU shows
this is unfair; but the simple argument explains the charge.
15 I agree that ‘it is clear that the concept of magnitude is in some way intended to play the
role of all three quantitative categories’ (Sutherland 2004: 432).
16 To be precise, my claim is not that possession of the schema for number is itself sufﬁcient
for this special representation of the whole but rather that it is necessary: one will need a
sophisticated ability to re-identify spatial locations over time, something that is made
possible by the schema for substance. One sees here how interlinked the various Kantian
categories are, with each contributing one aspect to a uniﬁed picture of rational, sensible
cognition; treatment of substance is, however, beyond this article.
17 There is a large experimental literature on these issues, often inﬂuenced by Piaget; for a
recent overview focussing on block play and the presence or absence of the relevant skills
in three year olds see Verdine et al. 2013.
18 I am very grateful to Lucy Allais, John Callanan, Colin McLear, Dennis Schulting, Nick
Stang and Clinton Tolley for discussion and comments on this material. I am also
indebted to the editor and two anonymous referees for their extremely helpful remarks
on an earlier draft.
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